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Abstract
Contrary to recent criticisms to the effect that the Supreme Court of Canada favours the rights of criminal
defendants and shuns the interests of the community, the Lamer Court has in fact championed the moral
requisites of the community in its constitutional jurisprudence on criminal fault. By viewing rights and
responsibilities as inextricably linked, the Lamer Court implicitly borrows from natural law traditions
espoused by the Dickson Court's most conspicuous dissenter on criminal fault issues-Mr. Justice William
McIntyre. This article argues that the tradition or philosophy underlying criminal fault as per the Lamer Court
contrasts with the individualist, rights-oriented tendency of the Dickson Court, and corresponds with the
approach of William McIntyre. Accordingly, the controversial holding of the Court in R v. Daviault does not
signal a retreat from the present Court's distinctive approach, as exemplified by the majority opinion in the
Creighton quartet and in DeSousa, Hundal, and Rodriguez.
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CRIMINAL FAULT AS PER THE
LAMER COURT AND THE GHOST OF
WILLIAM McINTYREO
BY ICHAEL J. BRYANT*
Contrary to recent criticisms to the effect that the
Supreme Court of Canada favours the rights of criminal
defendants and shuns the interests of the community,
the Lamer Court has in fact championed the moral
requisites of the community in its constitutional
jurisprudence on criminal fault. By viewing rights and
responsi'bilities as inextricably linked, the Lamer Court
implicitly borrows from natural law traditions espoused
by the Dickson Court's most conspicuous dissenter on
criminal fault issues-Mr. Justice William McIntyre.
This article argues that the tradition or philosophy
underlying criminal fault as per the Lamer Court
contrasts with the individualist, rights-oriented
tendency of the Dickson Court, and corresponds with
the approach of William McIntyre. Accordingly, the
controversial holding of the Court in R v.Daviault does
not signal a retreat from the present Court's distinctive
approach, as exemplified by the majority opinion in the
Creighton quartet and in DeSousa, Hundal, and
Roddguez.
Malgr6 des critiques r6centes que la Cour supreme du
Canada fait prevaloir les droits des accus6s sur les
intr8ts de Ia communaut, la Cour Lamer, A travers de
sa jurisprudence constitutionnelle en mati~re de faute
criminelle a, en effet, appuy6 les normes morales de la
communautd. En consid6rant les droits et les
responsabilit6s commes des notions inextricablement
Iies, la Cour Lamer s'inspire implicitement des
traditions de droit naturel adopt6es auparavant par le
juge de la Cour Dickson le plus dissident en mati~re de
faute criminelle--M, le juge McIntyre. Cet article
soutient que la tradition ou la philosophie soulignant la
faute criminelle, telie que d6finie par la Cour Lamer,
s'oppose A la tendance de Ia Cour Dickson de mettre
l'accent sur les individus et leurs droits mais s'accorde
plut8t avec la perspective de M. lo juge McIntyre. Par
cons6quent, la d~cision controversielle dans l'arr8t
Daviault n'est pas une drogation A la perspective
distincte de la Cour actuelle, ce qui est 6vident dans les
motifs de ]a majorit6 dans la quartette Creighton et
dans DeSousa, Hundal, et Rodrguez.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a recent spate of criticism of the Supreme Court
of Canada's holdings in the area of criminal law, based primarily upon ajudgment of last year involving most unpleasant facts: a drunken man
committing the act of rape against a partially paralyzed elderly woman.
In response to the Court's overturning of a guilty verdict in Daviault v.
The Queen,1 an unusual collection of critics-including a Quebec
senator, Reform Party MPs, women's groups, and newspaper
editorialists across Canada2-reacted with sufficient outrage to reach an
international audience, and inspire a rebuke from the U.S. State
Departments Starting from the proposition that extreme intoxication
ought not to excuse rape, some of the critics have also gone on to scold
the nine judges in more general terms. A spokesperson for victims of
crime charged that "[tihere is a pattern of offenders' rights winning over
the rights of the victim and the protection of the public in the majority of
those cases."4 Another was concerned that "[t]he message that is sent to
women and victims is that the justice system is not working for them."5
1 [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 [hereinafter Daviault]. The Court ordered a new trial, overturning the
Quebec C.A.'s holding that extreme intoxication could substitute for the minimal intent necessary to
commit the offence of sexual assault (the Criminal Code offence for, inter alia, rape). Daviault's
retrial was thrown out April 27, 1995 by Mr. Justice Girouard on separate procedural grounds: L.
Fitterman, "Man, 73, in 'too-drunk' rape case acquitted again" The [Montreal] Gazette (28 April
1995) Al.
2 See "Quebec senator moves to plug too-drunk defence loophole" The [Montreal] Gazette (17
November 1994) A18; J. Sheppard, "Supreme Court favoring accused, say critics" Calgary Herald
(14 October 1994) A3; "Rights for suspects" Macleans (10 October 1994) 21; Editorial, "Criminal
defence of drunkenness an offence to reason" Vancouver Sun (5 October 1994) A10; Editorial,
"Drunken defence cuts no ice" Toronto Star (6 November 1994) C2; Editorial, "Drunks who rape
and go free; Top court ruling means law should be changed" The [Montreal] Gazette (4 October
1994) B2.
3 For example, "U.S. Rebukes Canada Over Drunk Defence" Toronto Star (2 February 1995)
A13; C. Trueheart, "Drunkenness Defense Wins Canada Rape Case; Women's Rights Groups
Assail High Court" The Washington Post (12 November 1994); C.H. Farnsworth, "Women in
Canada Upset by Court Rulings on Drunkenness" New York Times (10 November 1994) A7;
"Canada: Canadian Court Under Fire Over Drunkenness Ruling" Reuters World Service (1
November 1994).
4 Sheppard, supra note 2.
5 Fitterman, supra note 1.
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And one article summed up the criticism with similarly loaded terms:
"[t]he Supreme Court of Canada has forgotten the need to punish the
guilty and protect the innocent in recent controversial decisions." 6
This view that the present Supreme Court of Canada is somehow
"soft on criminals" could not be farther from the truth, however, at least
compared to the jurisprudence produced by their predecessors of the
1980s-the "Dickson Court.' 7 It was the latter Court that provided
Canada with its first taste of criminal justice as policed by the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,8 and it was a very sour taste for those in
the law enforcement business? The Dickson Court's enlargement of the
rights of the criminally accused were viewed by some as revolutionary,10
leading the nation's premier constitutional law scholar to remark that a
"tidal wave of rights consciousness" had engulfed the countryP1 Indeed,
in several decisions considering the constitutional parameters of criminal
fault,12 it is argued below, the majority of the Dickson Court more often
than not upheld a distinctively rights-oriented tradition, necessarily
favouring individual liberties over conflicting civic responsibilities and
state duties.
Yet within the Dickson Court there stood an occasional but
conspicuous dissenter in the area of criminal law. The appointment
from British Columbia, William McIntyre, was made by Prime Minister
Trudeau in 1979. The Honourable Mr. Justice McIntyre served his
7 Reference to the "Dickson Court" might be traced to the "Dickson Legacy" Symposium
organized and published by the University of Manitoba [(1991) 20 Man. LJ.] on the occasion of the
retirement of Chief Justice Dickson. Thereafter, Canadian commentators borrowed from the
modem American practice of categorizing Supreme Court benches by the Chief Justice's name, the
Warren Court being the most famous.
8 Part I of the ConstitutionAct 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11 [hereinafter Charter].
9 Of particular impact were the following decisions, which either eliminated a long-standing
offence or dramatically altered criminal justice administration: R v.Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199; R
v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 [hereinafter Morgentaler]; R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636
[hereinafter Vaillancourt]; Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177
[hereinafter Singh].
1 0 See F.L. Morton, "The Charter Revolution and the Court Party" (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 627.
11 P.W. Hogg, Address (Oral remarks at the Round-table Conference, York University,
November 1991) [unpublished], cited in Morton, Zid at 628.
12 Reference to "criminal fault" is typically to the requisite mental element of a criminal
offence, Le., to the mens rea. It also raises questions as to where criminal fault may or may not
attach, such as in cases involving abortion, physician-assisted suicide, and constructive murder.
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tenure as Puisne Justice for precisely a decade. That his appointment
would (temporarily) upset the regional distribution of the justices for the
first time in the history of that Court (McIntyre J. replaced Spence J.
from Ontario) perhaps foreshadowed his intellectual contribution in the
area of criminal fault. For, jurisprudentially, McIntyre J. would never
quite fit in with the Dickson Court, a bench known more for the civil
libertarian impulses of Chief Justice Dickson, Madam Justice Wilson,
and Mr. Justice Lamer (as he then was) than for the deferential,
conservative stance of Mr. Justice McIntyreP
Notably, in two of the most dramatic invalidations of long-
standing criminal offences by the Dickson Court-the felony-murder
rule and the abortion provisions-McIntyre J. dissented.14 Indeed, at
least when confronted with portentous criminal law issues, McIntyre J.
was utterly disenchanted with the jurisprudence of individualism and
civil libertarianism without more; he seemed out of touch with the new
Canada as supervised by the Charter. Chief Justice Dickson himself was
said to have been comforted by McIntyre J.'s presence on the Court, as
he represented a sharp counterbalance to the tendencies of the majority.
But happy or not, the likes of Dickson C.J., Wilson, and Lamer JJ. would
have little to do with the jurisprudence of McIntyre J. on some critical
issues of criminal law, nor he with them.15
Today, contrary to the aforementioned claims of various critics,16
things have changed. With. the sole exception of the Chief Justice
himself, the Lamer Court appointments were all made by the Tory
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney-an unprecedented phenomenon in
Canadian history, albeit an uncontroversial one given the generally
favourable reception of each appointment! 7 Yet Mulroney's appointees
and their subsequent reconsideration of many criminal law issues may
have unintentionally conjured up an old ghost, a figure who roamed the
red-carpeted hallways of the Court throughout the 1980s with a
philosophy often very different from that of the majority of his
13 See, for example, P.H. Russell, "The Supreme Court in the 1980s: A Commentary on the
S.C.R. Statistics" (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L.J. 771 at 791; and, generally, D.M. Beatty, Talking
Heads and the Supremes: The Canadian Production of Constitutional Review (Toronto: Carswell,
1990), and M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto:
Thompson Educational, 1994) at 277.
14 See below at 12-15.
15 Compare Russell, supra note 13 at 789-91.
16 See supra note 2.
17 See discussion in W. Gold, "New Supreme Court justice an excellent choice" Calgary Herald
(21 November 1992) AS.
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colleagues. Reading the major criminal law opinions of the Lamer
Court today, the compulsion to double-check their authorship may be
inexplicable, if not a little eerie. Is that you, Judge McIntyre?
This essay considers the general themes and traditions driving
the major criminal law decisions of the 1990s, particularly concerning
criminal fault as supervised by the Charter. The majority holdings of the
present Court, in my view, reflect a contrast to the individualist, rights-
oriented tendency of the Dickson Court. And if one post-Charter
Supreme Court Justice embodied the antithesis of this rights-oriented
approach, it was the Honourable William McIntyre. Perhaps ironically,
his dissenting or minority judgments in the watershed cases of
Vaillancourt, R. v. Tutton, R. v. Waite,18 and (to a lesser extent)19
Morgentaler, have implicitly gained majority support from the present
Supreme Court of Canada. The recent ill-informed criticisms
notwithstanding,2 0 the majority of the present Court has, in fact,
attempted to balance individual rights with duties to self, community,
and state. The ghost of Mr. Justice William McIntyre2l may very well
become the unspoken muse and touchstone for contemporary Canadian
criminal jurisprudence.
II. A DIFFERENCE IN PHILOSOPHY OR TRADITION
In saying that the approach of McIntyre J. diverged from the
majority of the Dickson Court with regard to their treatment of criminal
fault, I wish to highlight a difference in philosophy or tradition. That is
to say, the majority of justices of the Dickson Court often engaged in
criminal and constitutional law analysis from a different starting point
than that of McIntyre J., basing their approach on different assumptions
about human nature and the traditions within which the criminal law
operates. The casual reader might view such talk of philosophical
traditions as terribly academic and unhelpful to the bar, bench, and
18 R v. Tutton, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1392 and R. v. Waite, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1436 [hereinafter Tutton
and Waite] were released contemporaneously.
19 Without entering into an analysis of Morgentaler, it must be disclosed at the outset that I am
not contending that McIntyre J.'s denial of a constitutional right to abortion is likely to receive
support of the present Court. Of greater interest is whether the traditions or assumptions driving
his judgment have commonalities with the present Court's philosophical orientation.
20 Supra note 2 and Section 5, below.
21 while the ghost metaphorically roams the hallways, the real person, it should be added, is
alive and well on the West Coast of Canada.
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legislators. But it can also be quite helpful in pinning down the past and
present orientations of the Supreme Court of Canada-one less prone
to generalization than its American counterpart, making a synthesis of
its predominant outlook a difficult task. What, then, are these diverging
traditions or philosophies?
Generally speaking, the majority of the Dickson Court22
borrowed from the tradition of Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and
John Locke. At least when faced with the constitutional parameters of
criminal fault, the Court focussed primarily upon individual rights, with
less reference to the accused's community or the obligations
accompanying membership in that community. The majority of the
Dickson Court's reasoning sometimes involved little more than a
utilitarian calculus, determining how to achieve the greatest good for the
greatest number, while avoiding determination of any universal "good"
along the way.
Bentham is the philosopher most frequently associated with this
concept of utilitarianism. For Bentham, humans are naturally pleasure-
seeking and pain-avoiding, and have no natural inclination for selfless
duties 23 With his focus on individualism, Mill also belongs, in part, to
this tradition. For Mill, individuals are free to pursue any of their
desires that cause no harm to fellow human beings. 4 Accordingly, Mill
was interested in "find[ing] the limit [of] legitimate interference of
collective opinion with individual independence," on the presumption
that individual rights necessarily transcended duties to self and state.25
The corollary of this individualist approach was the Lockean-inspiredjurisprudence that developed in the United States around privacy
rights,26 resulting in what Justice Louis Brandeis described as "the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. '' 27
22 That is, the "Dickson Court" as led principally by Dickson CJ., Wilson, and Lamer J$., who
wrote the most individualist majority decisions of that Court. See also supra note 7.
23 "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and
pleaswe": J. Bentham, Initoduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), J.H. Burns &
HLLA. Hart, eds. (London: Athlone Press, 1970) at 11 [emphasis in original].
24 J.S. Mill, "On Liberty" (1859), reprinted in S. Calm, ed., Classics of Western Philosophy
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977) at 934.
25lbid at 947. Mill is less known for his acknowledgement that "there are many positive acts
for the benefit of others which [anyone] may rightfully be compelled to perform": ibid. at 958.
2 6 See Glendon, infra note 28, c. 3.
2 7 01nstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 at 478 (1928). See generally, S.D. Warren & LD. Brandeis,
"The Right to Privacy" (1890-91) 4 Harv. L Rev. 193.
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Today, this tradition is associated with what Professor Mary Ann
Glendon refers to as "rights talk," which emphasizes individual civil
liberties without regard to corresponding duties. The focus on rights,
she argues, has trickled down all the way from early American notions of
property rights, through concerns over reputation and privacy, to
exaggerate individualism within America. According to Glendon, these
traditions have bred a "rights talk" of hyperindividualism and
insularity 28
The tradition working at cross purposes to these individualist
philosophies is difficult to single out, except to say that it rejects
individualism and "rights talk" without more. It borrows substantially
from natural law principles,29 and it views rights and responsibilities as
fused together. The writings of Aristotle, the Stoics, Cicero, and
Thomas Aquinas are representative of this tradition,30 as are those of
such contemporary thinkers as John Finnis, Lloyd Weinreb, and Arthur
Dyck.1 For example, Harvard Professor Dyck, a Canadian, bucks the
trend that selectively borrows from Mill, Bentham, Hobbes, and Locke,
and argues that rights ought to be linked with responsibilities in a way
that actualizes them.3 2 All people, he argues, have natural inhibitions
and proclivities that amount to "requisite[s] for communal life and
human life itself," and these become the basis of individual relations
with others.33 Thus, "[rights] have no reality apart from them and apart
from the moral responsibilities that make human relationships
28 M.A. Glendon, Rights Talk The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: Free
Press, 1991). Compare L Weinreb, Oedipus at Fenway Park What Rights Are and Why There Are
Any (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994). See also R.N. Bellah et al, Habits of the Heart:
Individualism and Commitment in American Life (New York: Harper & Row, 1985).
2 9 Reference to natural law is intended more for its association with thinkers advocating duties
than for its opposition to positivism. But note, as one famous defender of natural rights put it, that
"[i]t is difficult to achieve effective communication in any discussion of a term that bears as many
meanings as does 'natural law": LL Fuller, "Human Purpose and Natural Law" (1956) 53 J. Phil.
697 at 697.
30 See generally, Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. D. Ross (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1984); Cicero, De OQficiis, reprinted in U.T. Griffin & E.M. Atkins, eds., On Duties
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); T. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, reprinted in A.C.
Pegis, ed., Basic Writings ofSL ThomasAquinas (New York: Random House, 1945).
31 See generally, L.L. Weinreb, Natural Law and Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1987); and J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1980).
32 A.J. Dyck, Rethinking Rights and Responsibilities: The Moral Bonds of Community
(Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1994).
33 15d at 310.
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possible."3 4 Similarly, British political theorist David Selbourne has
recently propounded an elaborate theory of civic society, revolving
chiefly around the principle of duty.3 5 According to Selbourne, this
tradition is rooted in Greco-Roman, as well as Judeo-Christian
thought.36 Aboriginal groups in Canada have also long maintained an
emphasis upon one's responsibility to others, as Professor Mary Ellen
Turpel outlines in her influential work.3 7
Of course, no past or present member of the Supreme Court of
Canada fits neatly into either of these two broad philosophical
categories, and the traditions themselves may not be so exactly
compartmentalized. Moreover, judges rarely adopt a tradition or
philosophy explicitly, instead exhibiting the tendencies of a particular
tradition. Nevertheless, the basic assumption driving the former
Benthamite philosophy is one predicated on individualism and "rights
talk." The basic assumption driving the latter natural law philosophy,
for lack of a better term, is one predicated on the moral requisites of
community, which include both rights and responsibilities. It is
submitted that the tendencies of the majority of the Dickson Court, in
the area of criminal fault, were closer to the Benthamite tradition; the
tendencies of Mr. Justice McIntyre were closer to the natural law
tradition.38
In juxtaposing these two traditions, the intention is not to express
a preference. If one engages in legal analysis from a different starting
point, the reasoning will necessarily produce different answers. My
concern is only to highlight these differences, which will become clearer
as we consider the diverging criminal fault jurisprudence of the Dickson
Court majority and McIntyre J., and then bolster that contrast with the
recent criminal law decisions of the Lamer Court. In so doing, one sees
the crux of the difference between the old and new (post-Charter)
criminal law jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada. The recent
34 Ibid. at 390.
35 D. Selbourne, The Principle of Duty: An Essay on the Foundations of the Civic Order
(London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994) at 148.
36 I.4, c. 1.
37 "Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter. Interpretive Monopolies, Cultural
Differences" (1989-90) 6 C.H.R.Y.B. 3.
38 That said, it is also true that by the end of his tenure as Chief Justice of Canada, Brian
Dickson had softened his individualist stance, trumpeting the virtues of both rights and "the
responsibilities which must be shared by all for those rights to become meaningful": Remarks by the
Right Honourable Brian Dickson at Ashbury College's Closing Ceremonies, 10 June 1989, quoted
in Iacobucci, infra note 96 at 19.
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case law coming out of the Court represents, to some extent, a reaction
to the results of individualistic and rights-oriented jurisprudence. Or at
least it has more in common with the philosophy at work in the criminal
law judgments of Mr. Justice McIntyre.
However, it does not follow that McIntyre J. is somehow the
variable explaining why or how the criminal jurisprudence of the Court
has unfolded since his retirement. The presence of this ghost is more
ironic than causal, worthy of belated recognition, though not the
linchpin in the shift of traditions discussed herein. The juxtaposition
should, therefore, not be mistaken for a cause-and-effect argument, but
as illustrative of the different starting points of the Dickson and Lamer
Courts in the area of criminal fault. Like the ghost in Hamlet, the ghost
of Justice McIntyre does not play a leading role, though he may end up
stealing the show by the final curtain call.
III. THE DISSENTS OF WILLIAM MCINTYRE
As it turns out, William McIntyre's magnum opus may not have
been one of his famous dissents as McIntyre J., but rather one written
while serving on the British Columbia Court of Appeal. It was in 1975
that McIntyre J.A. wrote what may have been the most thorough and
rigorous judgment rejecting the death penalty in Canada, R v. Miller and
Cockriell.3 9 In what would become a pattern for much of his criminal
law jurisprudence, the opinion represented the future of the criminal law
(the death penalty provision being repealed the next year,40 and
eventually ruled contrary to the Charter by a plurality of the Supreme
Court41), but was a dissenting judgment at the time.
Indeed, there would be many dissents. Statistically, McIntyre J.
dissented more than most of his contemporaries on the Supreme Court
in the 1980s.42 However, the statistics do not reveal the extent to which
the philosophy of William McIntyre, at least regarding criminal fault,
diverged from that of the majority of the Dickson Court. Having said
39 (1976), 63 D.LR. (3d) 193 (B.C. C.A.), affd [1977] 2 S.C.R. 680 [hereinafter Miller and
Cockrieil].
4 0 Criminal LawAmendmentAct (No. 2), 1976, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 105.
41 In Iandler v. Canada (Muister of Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, the majority did not consider
whether capital punishment was cruel and unusual punishment contrary to section 12 of the Charter,
the case turning on jurisdiction instead. But Cory and Sopinka JJ. (with whom Lamer CJ.
concurred) held that capital punishment was cruel and unusual.
42 See Russell, supra note 13 at 790.
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that, the case can no doubt be made that McIntyre J. could be just as
much a judicial activist 43 as he was deferential to Parliament.44 But that
argument would miss my point, which is far less ambitious than an
exhaustive statement on the jurisprudence of Mr. Justice McIntyre.
Rather, it is submitted here that where the majority of the Dickson
Court was generally of one metaphysical or philosophical position,
McIntyre J. generally belonged in another. And it is the latter which has
prevailed'under the present Court.
If it is at all possible to identify these two distinguishable
traditions, they are best revealed by the three watershed decisions of
Morgentaler, Vaillancourt, and Tutton. In those decisions, McIntyre J.
distinguished himself, either writing alone or in the minority, by taking a
view of section 7 of the Charter45 which left room not only for accused's
rights, but also for duties or responsibilities-of the individual to others,
and of the state to its citizens. In contrast, the rest of the Court typically
engaged in a utilitarian analysis that necessarily tipped the balance in
favour of individualism, and practically ignored the responsibilities of
individu~ls to others.
But before looking at those cases, it may be instructive to revisit
the earlier dissent of McIntyre J.A. in Miller and Cockriell.46 In that
case, the appellants were convicted of murder punishable by death for
shooting a police officer. The majority of the British Columbia Court of
Appeal rejected the claim that, inter alia, the death penalty amounted to
cruel and unusual punishment contrary to section 2 of the Canadian Bill
of Rights.4 7 Although that holding was unanimously upheld by the
Supreme Court of Canada, the death penalty issue had become moot
since the relevant provisions were repealed prior to the release of the
43 For a most telling example, see his dissent in Mdler and Cockriel/ supra note 39, and his
concurrence with Beetz J. in Singh, supra note 9 and with Dickson CJ. in Hunter v. Southam Inc.,
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.
44 See Vaillancourt andMorgentalersupra note 9, and Tutton and Waite, supra note 18. For a
shrewd disassembling of the "activist" tag, see G. Marshall, Constitutional Theory (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1971) c. 4.
4 5 Section 7 is the procedural and substantive due process provision under the Charter. See
P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) c. 44.
46 Supra note 39.
4 7 S.C. 1960, c. 44.
[VOi. 33 NO. I
The Ghost of William McIntyre
judgment.48 Regardless, McIntyre J.A. remained the lone appellate
justice finding the death penalty to be cruel and unusual punishment.
His dissent in that case represents a model for his more
renowned criminal law jurisprudence on the Supreme Court, in that
McIntyre J.A. was as concerned with the community as he was with the
individual. Drawing on traditional conceptions of criminal law aims,
McIntyre J.A. tested capital punishment against the purposes of
deterrence, reformation, and retribution. And in setting out these
"standards by which the punishment of death may be judged," he viewed
the issue through the lens of society as well as the individual:
It would not be permissible to impose a punishment which has no value in thesense that it
does not protect society by deterring criminal behaviour or serve some other social
purpose.... Capital punishment makes no pretence at reformation or rehabilitation and
its only purposes must then be deterrent and retributive. While there can be no doubt of
its effect on the person who suffers the punishment, to have a socialpurpose in the broader
sense it would have to have a deterrent effect on people generally and thus tend to reduce
the incidence of violent crime. ... Furthermore, even assuming some deterrent value, I
am of the opinion it would be cruel and unusual if it is not in accord with public standards
of decency and propriety, if it is unnecessary because of the existence of adequate
alternatives, if it cannot be applied upon a rational basis in accordance with ascertained
or ascertainable standards, and if it is excessive and out of proportion to the crimes it
seeks to restrain.4 9
Note that the approach does not turn on individual interests alone (such
as an absolute right to life) or strict utilitarianism (the deterrent issue
without more), but on a combination of individual and social
considerations 5 0 This philosophy is tacitly associated with the natural
law tradition discussed previously,5 1 and it figures prominently in
McIntyre J.'s minority judgments on the Supreme Court of Canada.
The philosophical tradition that Justice McIntyre borrows from
recognizes individuals in the context of the larger community-
individuals are seen as connected to one another by both rights and
responsibilities. The tradition views even murderers as members of a
community. Thus, in Miller and Cockriell, having exhaustively cited the
evidence refuting the death penalty's deterrent and retributive value,
4 8 For this reason, as well as the general disregard afforded the Canadian Bill of Rights by the
Supreme Court of Canada, the death penalty holding in Mdler and Cockrie!! "is not a reliable guide
to the likely outcome of a Charter challenge": Hogg, supra note 45 at 1137.
49 Miler and Cockrieil, supra note 39 at 260 [emphasis added].
50 By "social considerations," I mean those apart from individual rights, if it be possible to so
dissect rights and responsibilities. Such considerations might be viewed as either individual
responsibilities to the community or community requisites met by and for individuals.
51 Supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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McIntyre J.A. invokes the inextricable link between individual and
community by citing Brennan J. of the U.S. Supreme Court:
The calculated killing of a human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial
of the executed person's humanity. The contrast with the plight of a person punished by
imprisonment is evident.... A prisoner remains a member of the human family.... An
executed person [unlike the prisoner] has indeed "lost the right to have rights." As one
19th century proponent of punishing criminals by death declared, "When a man is hung,
there is an end of our relations with him. His execution is a way of saying, 'You are not
fit for this world, take your chance elsewhere.' "52
This passage underscores Justice McIntyre's philosophy that, to
paraphrase John Donne, "no person is an island, entire of itself;" that
bonds exist amongst individuals within a community that ought never be
severed. Apparently, McIntyre J.A. rejected outright the terminal
ending of relations with members of his human community.
Such a tradition goes both ways, however, placing as onerous a
responsibility on an individual to society as that individual may demand
from society. In this sense, it should not be surprising that William
McIntyre, once Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, should
construe the Charter with continued emphasis on both society and
individual, and on both rights and responsibilities.
Thus, in Vaillancourt, McIntyre J. returns to the question of
societal interests in deterring the possession and use of weapons. In that
case, the Court considered the bugbear of many criminal law scholars,
the felony-r'urder (or constructive murder) rule. The rule had remained
intact in the Criminal Code53 under section 213(d), with liability for
murder attaching if death ensued as a consequence of the use or
possession of a weapon. The majority of the Dickson Court joined the
chorus of academics54 in rejecting the felony-murder rule as violative of
the criminal law principles of correspondence and fair dealing; that is,
the idea that conviction will follow only where the mens rea corresponds
with the actus reus in a manner that fairly reflects criminal liability for
culpable acts.55
52 Mdler and Cockdell, supra note 39 at 272-73, citing Furman v. State of Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
at 290 (1972) [footnote omitted].
53 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
54 See the discussion in D. Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 1987).
55 See generally, AJ. Ashworth, Principles of CriminalLaw (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992) c. 1 and
3; D. Stuart & RJ. Delisle, Learning Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1993) at
443-71.
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The Court in Vaillancourt struck down section 213(d), with
McIntyre J. dissenting. Although strewn with the language of judicial
deference,-56 the core of McIntyre J.'s analysis is his consideration of
deterrence. Empirically, he may have erred in his finding that the
felony-murder rule serves an important deterrent purpose. But his
approach was much broader than that of the majority, as per Lamer J.
(as he then was), which focussed on individual rights and the effect of
stigmatizing the accused as a murderer. In contrast, McIntyre J.
assessed both the accused's rights and his corresponding responsibility,
as enforced by the state, to "bear the risk" of conviction of murder when
joining in the common purpose to commit robbery in which death
resulted from an accomplice's actions. 5 7 He was not impressed by the
"principal complaint" of the majority that "Parliament should not have
chosen to call [the relevant offence] 'murder.' "158 Indeed, such an
individualist outlook was inconsistent with his approach to criminal law,
for it left out one-half of the equation.
Therefore, when the occasion arose two years later, it was
natural for McIntyre J. to interpret the offence of criminal negligence
causing death in a manner that held individuals accountable not only for
thinking wrongly (subjective fault), but for failing to think at all
(objective fault). In Tutton and Waite, 9 where the Court split 3-3,
McIntyre J. wrote the minority judgments for both appeals, interpreting
the fault element of section 219 of the Criminal Code as established on
an objective standard, showing a marked and substantial departure from
the care that a reasonable person would have exercised in the
circumstances.
Contrary to Wilson J.'s view, subjective awareness of the risk
involved was necessary to convict. Indeed, the subjectivist approach to
criminal fault may have been the raison d'etre of the Dickson Court
majority's contribution to criminal fault.60 However, in Tutton and
Waite, McIntyre J. viewed the subjectivist approach as permitting the
non-thinking to avoid responsibility in circumstances where their actions
resulted in homicide. The subjectivist approach, of course, emphasizes
the subject-the individual, his view of the circumstances, and any
56 See Vaillancourt, supra note 9 at 637, 639.
571bid at 664-65, citing)? v. Munro and Munro (1983), 8 C.C.C. (3d) 260 at 301.
58 Vaillancourt, ibid. at 663.
59 Supra note 18.
60 See MA Stalker, "Chief Justice Dickson's Principles of Criminal Law" (1991) 20 Man. LI.
308 at 313.
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stigma attaching to his conviction. The approach of McIntyre 3., on the
other hand, emphasized the state's need to require individuals engaged
in life-threatening activities, such as dangerous driving (Waite) or failure
to provide parental necessities (Tutton), to fulfill the requisites of
community, as enforced by the criminal law. Marked departures from
that standard resulting in death of the victim would thus trigger a
manslaughter conviction for the perpetrator.
This divergence of traditions came to a head in Morgentaler. In
that now famous case, a majority of the Court61 struck down the
abortion provisions of the Criminal Code on the basis that they imposed
unjust procedural burdens on the pregnant woman seeking an abortion.
Madam Justice Wilson, in a separate opinion, invalidated the provisions
for substantive, not procedural reasons. What is significant for our
purposes, however, is that all five of the seven justices allowing the
appeal concentrated primarily on the effects of the Criminal Code upon
the individual. The most austere formulation of this individualism came
from Madam Justice Wilson: "the rights guaranteed in the Charter erect
around each individual, metaphorically speaking, an invisible fence over
which the state will not be allowed to trespass." 62 Viewed in such terms,
the Charter represented the antithesis to the adage that "no person is an
island;" on Wilson J.'s reasoning, every one was an island unto oneself,
with high fences to keep out the meddlesome, paternalistic state.
In the midst of this high mark of individualist language and
reasoning of the Dickson Court, the opinion of McIntyre J. might be
seen as terribly narrow and insensitive, with more concern for judicial
deference than for hypothetical breaches of the Charter. Indeed, the
essence of his judgment is an originalist approach to constitutional law,
whereby without an actual abortion right identified under the Charter,
there could be no invalidation of Parliament's abortion law. As one
commentator pointed out, the flaw in this reasoning lies in the "frozen
rights approach" 63 that has proved unworkable with the passage of time
and untenable in light of the Court's role as interpreter of the
Constitution. To be sure, resort to the originalist approach and rhetoric
about judicial deference rarely stand the test of time.
6 1 Per Dickson CJ., Lamer J. concurring; per Beetz J., Estey J. concurring: supra note 9.
6 2 Morgentaler, ibid. at 164. But see Perka v. R [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232 at 268ff., where Wilson J.
seems to distance herself from hyperindividualism. Nonetheless, such acknowledgement of
individual duties is less representative of her juridical philosophy than Morgentaler, which is surely
her most paradigmatic judgment.
63 D. Pothier, "Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1987-88 Term" (1989) 11 Supreme
Court LR. 41 at 48.
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But setting aside the methodology, McIntyre J.'s substantive
approach is more interestingly consistent with his position in Miller and
Cockriell. In both cases there is an emphasis on holding the state to
rigorous examination for its endangerment of life (or potential life).
The state may so interfere with individual rights where the needs of the
community are held paramount over individual rights. In Morgentaler,
McIntyre J. thus held that the state could properly prohibit, in some
circumstances, what three-fifths of Canadians viewed as "socially
undesirable conduct" (the other two-fifths falling evenly into the
absolute anti- and pro-abortion camps).64 Was there an infringement of
a section 7 right?65 "The evidence reveals that much of the anguish
associated with abortion is inherent and unavoidable and that there is
really no psychologically painless way to cope with an unwanted
pregnancy." 66 Without claiming a personal opinion regarding the
validity of abortion as a right, McIntyre J. concluded with much
reference to "social policy" considerations and an unwillingness to be
moved by individual harm occasioned by unwanted pregnancies.67
The point of this explication is not to discuss the merits either of
Morgentaler, or of criminalizing abortion. Rather, this case highlights the
insistence of McIntyre J. to focus equally upon community interests,
individual responsibilities, and, on no higher footing, civil liberties.
Whether such an approach be balanced or skewed, the tradition from
which McIntyre J. was operating (and I am not speaking of any position
regarding abortion itself) more closely resembled a natural law position
than it did the individualist, rights-oriented one exemplified by the
majority of the Dickson Court.
IV. THE GHOST GAINS A MAJORITY
If McIntyre J.'s opinions in the major criminal fault cases
garnered little support from his colleagues in the mid-1980s, today many
have attained majority status. As of the 1993 decision in R. v. Hundal,68
his judgments in Tutton and Waite have explicitly prevailed over those of
64Supra note 9 at 136.
65 In answering whether abortion was a constitutional right, McIntyre L first asserted that a
breach of section 7 requires "more than an interference with priorities and aspirations," such
interferences being in the nature of life in the modem regulatory state: ibia& at 143.
6 6Tb at 148.
671bu at 155-56.
68 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 867 [hereinafter Hundal].
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Dickson C.J., La Forest, and Wilson JJ. Later that year, in R. v.
Creighton,6 9 the reasoning in McIntyre J.'s judgment in Vaillancourt
arguably received indirect support, in addition to the specific affirmation
of his reasoning in Tutton and Waite. And in Rodriguez v. British
Columbia (A.G.),70 a majority of the Court came down on the side of the
tradition espoused by McIntyre J. in Morgentaler, assessing the issue of
physician-assisted suicide with an emphasis on both rights and duties,
and permitting the state to interfere most gravely with individual
aspirations in the name of life and the protection of community.
But other than the explicit affirmations (namely, in Hundal and
Creighton), it goes without saying that the dissents of McIntyre 3.
discussed herein do not represent good law. What is more interesting
today is that the philosophical traditions underlying his criminal fault
judgments are no longer in the minority, where they languished for much
of the last decade. Today the Court has articulated this tradition more
openly than the circumspect McIntyre J. would have dreamed, again
through watershed decisions involving life and death.
The most vivid illustration of the shift in judicial philosophies is
provided by the Creighton quartet. The full bench took its cue from the
majority findings in R. v. DeSousa71 and Hundal to the effect that, for
certain offences, a criminal fault test of objective foreseeability would
suffice. This test was viewed as a necessary exception to the criminal law
principles of correspondence and fair dealing,7 2 and consistent with
principles of fundamental justice pursuant to section 7 of the Charter.
What ruffled commentators was that an objective standard, as opposed
to a subjective one, could operate in the realm of serious criminal
offences (cases of the Creighton quartet dealt with different
circumstances of unlawful act manslaughter, careless storage of firearms,
and failure to provide necessities). Indeed, it is ironic that the Court
would be lambasted for allegedly being "soft on criminals,"73 as such
criticism came in the wake of severe academic castigation for being
69 R v. Creighton, [1993].3 S.C.R. 3; R. v. Gossett, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 76; R. v. Finlay, [1993] 3
S.C.R. 103; R v. Naglik, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 122. The four decisions were released contemporaneously
and disposed of by reasons in R v. Creighton [hereinafter Creighton].
70 [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 [hereinafter Rodriguez].
71 [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944 [hereinafterDeSousa].
72 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
73 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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violative of accused's rights.74 Perhaps the better view lies in the middle
way.
Thus, imperceptibly, did the ghost of William McIntyre arrive.
Like McIntyre J., the present Court started from the presumption that
the criminal law may properly enforce not only "the right not to be
harmed" pursuant to a Millian view of justice,75 but may also enforce
objectively determined duties upon individuals to meet the moral
requisites of community, at least in circumstances endangering life.
Recall that, in Miller and Cockriell, McIntyre J.A. was vitally concerned
that Canada's criminal law invoke duties protecting "society," as well as
individuals. He assessed "social purpose[s] in the broader sense," rather
than the narrow, individualist sense, and he found a place in criminal law
for "public standards of decency and propriety." 76 So too does the
present Court view criminal fault as not necessarily hamstrung by the
Charter in its efforts to enforce the most austere requisites of
community.
Therefore, the majority in Creighton upheld the "thin-skull"
principle (that one takes one's victim as one finds him or her) as a
permissible means of holding individuals accountable for their actions.77
It was on this point that the case turned, since the thin-skull rule is
incompatible with a subjective test. The minority view, although stating
its preference for an objective test for liability, was nonetheless unwilling
to accept all the harsh results that the thin-skull rule countenanced.
Rather, an individualist approach was preferred in the minority
decisions of the Creighton quartet, fittingly authored by one of the
individualist school's most prominent voices of the Dickson
Court-Chief Justice Lamer. In his view, nurture eclipses nature in a
manner that permits an accused's particular perceptions and
74 See the vitriolic attack of Professor Donald Stuart in "Continuing Inconsistency But Also
Now Insensitivity That Won't Work" (1993) 23 C.R. (4th) 240. For a more balanced but highly
critical comment, see A.D. Gold, "Constructive Manslaughter Should Not Have Survived" (1993)
23 C.R. (4th) 262; see also, P. Healy, "The Creighton Quartet: Enigma Variations in a Lower Key"
(1993) 23 C.R. (4th) 265.
75 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
76 Supra note 39 at 260.
7 7 The rule "requires aggressors, once embarked on their dangerous course of conduct which
may foreseeably injure others, to take responsibility for all the consequences that ensue, even to
death": Creighton, supra note 69 at 52,per McLachlin J.
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characteristics to be taken into account when determining fault,78
arguably making the minority test an objective one in name only.79
Like the tradition espoused by Justice McIntyre, the majority in
Creighton seemed concerned with deterring socially unacceptable acts
that threaten the community.8 0 Accordingly, the Court embraced a
broader role for the state than that envisioned by Wilson J.'s
aforementioned "fencing in" of the individual.81 As McLachlin J. put it,
"[t]he criminal law must reflect not only the concerns of the accused, but
the concerns of the victim and, where the victim is killed, the concerns of
society for the victim's fate. Both go into the equation of justice."8 2
Thus, instead of starting with the individual and building fences around
him or her, the Court today views an accused in the context of his or her
community, thereby permitting society, through the state's criminal law,
to enforce both rights and responsibilities in a manner that "is necessary
to the general welfare."83
This shift of traditions or philosophical perspectives from the
Dickson Court to the present Court became complete with the majority
judgment in Rodriguez. In that case, the Court considered the
constitutional validity of the physician-assisted suicide offence in the
Criminal Code. As with Morgentaler, the Rodriguez case left no room for
justices to hide their metaphysical stripes. If one believed that the
individual had the right to do whatever she wanted, provided it did not
harm others, then one would view the state as wrongfully interfering with
the late Susan Rodriguez's assisted suicide. It would follow that no
78 The test set out by the Chief Justice assesses "the reasonable person who possesses all of
the accused's limitations," or the "reasonable person with the accused's make-up": ibid. at 31.
79 Ile majority addresses the effects of Lamer CJ.'s objective test by way of example. Under
the minority's test, McLachlin J. asserts that "an inexperienced, uneducated, young person, like the
accused in 1? v. Naglik ... could be acquitted, even though she does not meet the standard of the
reasonable person .... On the other hand, a person with special experience, like Mr. Creighton in
this case, or the appellant police officer in 1?. v. Gossett ... will be held to a higher standard than the
ordinary reasonable person": ibid. at 61.
80 Ibid. at 56: "To tell people that if they embark on dangerous conduct which foreseeably may
cause bodily harm which is neither trivial or transient, and which in fact results in death, they will
not be held responsible for the death but only for aggravated assault, is less likely to deter such
conduct than a message that they will be held responsible for the death, albeit under manslaughter
not murder." See also ibid. at 65-66.
8 1 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
82 Creighto, supra note 69 at 57.
83 INi. at 63, citing O.W. Holmes, The Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1881) at 108:
"[W]hen men live in society, a certain average of conduct, a sacrifice of individual peculiarities
going beyond a certain point, is necessary to the general welfare."
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criminal fault attached to aiding or abetting suicide, or at least such
criminalization would be contrary to section 7 of the Charter. This is the
individualist, Millian position most clearly advocated by MacEachern
C.J. in his dissenting judgment in Rodriguez,84 which is reminiscent of
Wilson J. in Morgentaler. If one believed, on the other hand, that the
state could rightfully limit individual liberties for the sake of the victim
and the welfare of the community, then a different reasoning would
follow. Starting with the philosophical position that life ought to be
nurtured and preserved in the face of individual wishes, one would
uphold the criminal offence of physician-assisted suicide.85 This
position, implicit throughout the criminal jurisprudence of McIntyre J.,
was forcefully adopted by the majority of the Court in Rodriguez.
For instance, just as McIntyre J.A. expressed the concern in
Miller and Cockriell that capital punishment threatened "by its very
nature, a denial of the executed person's humanity, ''8 6 so does Sopinka
J., for the majority of the Court in Rodriguez, organize his reasons
around the "intrinsic value of human life and on the inherent dignity of
every human being," thereby acknowledging the "generally held and
deeply rooted belief in our society that human life is sacred or
inviolable."8 7  Sopinka J. juxtaposes "rights talk" (the "right to
terminate" life) with the language of morality ("intrinsic concern[ ]...
with the well-being of the living person ... [which is] sacred or
inviolable"),88 indirectly eschewing the tradition or philosophy of
individualism.
In sum, the majority in Rodriguez rejected the notion that the
principles of fundamental justice turn upon individual-based principles
of privacy,8 9 or "justice in the eye of the beholder only."90 Similar to
Justice McIntyre's broad, inclusive approach to the principles of
fundamental justice, Sopinka J. reasons that "respect for human dignity
and autonomy" is but one component of justice "upon which our society
84 (1993), 79 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (B.C.C.A.) at 20: "[section 7 of the Charter] was enacted for the
purpose of ensuring human dignity and individual control, so long as it harms no one else."
85 Compare Dyck, supra note 32, c. 9 for his metaphysical analysis of American "right to life"
case law.
86 See supra note 52 at 272 and accompanying text.
87 Rodriguez supra note 70 at 585.
88 bIN
8 9 Ibid. at 589-90, citing LH. Tribe,American Constitutional Law, 2d ed. (Mineola, N.Y.:
Foundation Press, 1988) at 1370-71.
90lbUd at 590 [emphasis in original].
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is based."91 So the majority held in Rodriguez that the principles of
fundamental justice, inter alia, embody the requisites of the community:
"The principles of fundamental justice are concerned not only with the
interest of the person who claims his liberty has been limited, but with
the protection of society."92
And society's interests, the Court held in Rodriguez, permitted
the Criminal Code to reach over the metaphorical fence built around the
individual, in order to vindicate those societal beliefs. 93 Such thinking
closely resembles the refusal of Justice McIntyre to "end our relations"
with any member of the human community, viewing all peoples as "fit
for this world" at all times.9 4 In short, Rodriguez borrows from a
tradition associated more with natural law than with individualism, the
majority focussing upon society and joining the tradition of Calvin,
whereby humans are social beings who "realize their nature with
communal support."95
The vitality of this tradition is further evinced by a lecture given
by Mr. Justice Iacobucci in 1992, in which he made a straightforward
case for the balancing of rights with corresponding duties.96 Having put
forward an account of classical, religious, and modem contributions to
the contemporary understanding of human rights, Iacobucci J. made a
statement that may best sum up the present Court's philosophical
perspective: "the only way in which we can properly claim and exercise
our constitutionally entrenched rights is to do so in a manner consistent
with the obligations we owe to one another as equal citizens and human
beings."9 7 While this is obviously not a judicial statement,98 but a
scholarly one harkening back to his days as a law professor, it reflects the
91 ]bid at 592.
9 2 bid at 593-94 citing Cwningham v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143 at 151-52.
93 
"In upholding the respect for life, [the assisted suicide offence] may discourage those who
consider that life is unbearable at a particular moment, or who perceive themselves to be a burden
upon others, from committing suicide": Rodziguez ibia at 608.
94 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
95 Dyck, supra note 32 at 277. Note, however, that Sopinka J. explicitly avoids theological
sources, making the parenthetical comment that his reference to "sacred" is used "in the non-
religious sense ... to mean that human life is seen to have a deep intrinsic value of its own":
Rodiguez, supra note 70 at 585.
96 The Honourable Mr. Justice Frank lacobucci, "The Evolution of Constitutional Rights and
Corresponding Duties: The Leon Ladner Lecture" (1992) 26 U.B.C. L Rev. 1.
97 Ibii at 13.
9 8 Nevertheless, query whether his later musings do not describe the present Court's view of
the "principles of fundamental justice" under section 7 of the Charter see ibia at 14, 17.
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shift in traditions from the Dickson Court's individualism to a broader
view of rights and responsibilities under the Lamer Court.
V. DAVIAULT: DRAWING A LINE AROUND CRIMINAL FAULT
All of which brings us to the controversial rape case referred to
at the beginning of this article. The already infamous facts of DaviaultO
are, indeed, quite horrendous, and one cannot imagine a case more
susceptible to judicial empathy for the victim and disdain for the
accused. Rightly or wrongly, however, the Supreme Court of Canada
did not confirm the axiom that hard cases make bad law. Rather, they
stated what surely any criminal lawyer views as trite law: sexual assault
requires both an actus reus and a mens rea of some form, depending on
the terms of the statute or common law. Those accused who are literally
mindless, so incapacitated that they are akin to automatons, cannot be
said to have the requisite mens rea for an offence requiring intent or
recklessness. Barring an offence for putting oneself into a mindless
state, an accused cannot be convicted in the absence of the requisite
elements of sexual assault. But there is no such offence for
mindlessness, nor was there a finding at trial that all elements for sexual
assault were met, and so a new trial was ordered. 10
Accordingly, the ratio decidendi of Daviault was far from
controversial and, in a characteristic judgment of Mr. Justice Cory, may
be simply put: "the requisite mental element [for sexual assault] is simply
an intention to commit the sexual assault or recklessness as to whether
the actions will constitute an assault." This holding does not present a
problem. Rather, the facts themselves were horrible and lacking an air
of reality: how could a near-automaton commit the act of non-
consensual intercourse?
If circumstances exculpating the accused do exist, they must be
rare indeed, bordering on, but not quite achieving, the impossible.
Indeed, Justice Minister Allan Rock has argued before a House of
Commons committee that there is no scientific evidence proving that
extreme drunkenness causes people to act in a state akin to
automatism.1 01 In any event, the overwhelming majority of accused
rapists will have no such defense, since it is too physiologically
99 Supra note 1 and accompanying text.
10 0 The defendant was eventually acquitted on separate procedural grounds: ibid.
101 D. Vienneau, "Rock rejects drunk defence" Toronto Star (8 April 1995) A10. Compare
the approach of McIntyre J. in R v. Bernard, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833 [hereinafter Bernard].
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anomalous to be so intoxicated as to both achieve a state akin to
automatism (thus risking death) and commit the actus reus of sexual
assault. But, arguably, it may be physiologically possible to do so, as it is
apparently possible to commit homicide while "sleepwalking."102 That
such prima facie unbelievable acts of humankind are de facto possible
does not underscore their status as most improbable circumstances.
Therefore, the outraged critics might have misdirected their wrath upon
the Court, instead leveling more apt criticism at the perpetrator and at
legislators for leaving such an appalling lacuna in the criminal law.
But does it also follow, as suggested in the dissenting judgment
of Sopinka J., that the majority decision in Daviault runs counter to the
Supreme Court's recent holdings on criminal fault? On the one hand,
Sopinka J. is quite right to characterize those judgments, and particularly
the Creighton quartet, as focussing on concepts of moral innocence and
individual responsibility.103 On the other hand, it would be wrong to
suggest that Creighton stands for.the proposition that no mens rea need
be established to convict as long as some moral blameworthiness may be
plucked willy-nilly from the facts. McLachlin J. could not have said it
any clearer in Creighton: "No person can be sent to prison without mens
rea, or a guilty mind ... .. -104 Thus, when the majority goes on to assert in
Creighton that a conviction is constitutionally valid "[p]rovided an
element of mental fault or moral culpability is present,"1 05 they are not
talking about some random element of mental fault, but the requisite
mental fault under the offence. If that offence is construed as criminal
negligence, as in Creighton, then that mens rea of an objectively culpable
mental element is constitutionally sufficient. This is very different from
permitting conviction for virtually any presence of culpability, regardless
of its relation to the offence.
In sum, Sopinka J.'s dissent in Daviault captured the essence of
criminal fault as per the Lamer Court, consistent with his judgments in
DeSousa and Rodiguez, while differing with the majority only on his
common law assessment of whether extreme voluntary intoxication was
an exculpatory circumstance for sexual assault. The majority in Daviault
were permitted to circumscribe their departure from the criminal
principles of correspondence and fair dealing, as set out in recent
decisions beginning with DeSousa and triumphing in Creighton. Without
102 SeeR v. Parks, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 871.
103 Daviault, supra note 1 at 117-19, per Sopinka 3.
104 Creighton, supra note 69 at 54, cited in Daviault, ibid. at 117, per Sopinka J.
105 Creighton, ibid. at 54; cited in Daviaui ibid. at 117, per Sopinka J.
[VOL 33 NO. I
The Ghost of William McIntyre
an offence of dangerous intoxication, there can be no responsibility or
accountability of the accused, and thus no criminal liability, where the
accused is totally incapacitated or mindless as a result of extreme
intoxication.
If there was a shortcoming in the majority judgment in Daviault,
it was the failure to state the extent to which such cases were "rare.
'1°6
The direction of Cory J. may have been mild to a fault, although it was
clearly "obvious" to the Court that cases such as Daviault were
exceptional. 107 Nevertheless, trial judges, not to mention the general
public, should have been less subtly treated to direction from the Court.
With the aid of hindsight, it is respectfully submitted that appellate
courts might more forcefully state the rarity of such cases in the
future.108
VI. CONCLUSION
[Ghosts] are a way of exemplifying something which you know to be
true but which is very hard to give substance to.
Robertson Davies1°9
The ghost of William McIntyre appears to be haunting some of
the watershed decisions of the Dickson Court, undercutting if not
reversing the individualist, rights-oriented tendencies of that early post-
Charter jurisprudence on criminal fault. By employing a dual focus on
rights and responsibilities, and orienting criminal fault, in part, upon the
moral requisites of community, the Supreme Court of Canada has ended
up implicitly adopting the philosophical perspective espoused by Mr.
Justice McIntyre throughout his judicial career. It does not follow,
however, that the Lamer Court should be typecast as "conservative" or
106 Daviault, ibid at 100,per Cory j.
107 Cory J. devoted a single sentence by way of direction: "It is obvious that it will only be on
rare occasions that evidence of such an extreme state of intoxication can be advanced and perhaps
only on still rarer occasions is it likely to be successful": ibld
108 Appellate courts might consider the statement of McIntyre J. in Bernard, supra note 101 at
879: "As Fauteux J. observed in R. v. George ..., it is almost metaphysically inconceivable for a
person to be so drunk as to be incapable of forming the minimal intent to apply force." Note that
the Court in Daviau/t neither followed nor overruled the judgment of McIntyre J. in Bernar.
109 Quoted in M. Gussow, " 'A Moralist Possessed by Humor': A Conversation with
Robertson Davies" The New York Tunes Book Review (5 February 1995) at 25.
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generally deferential to Parliament, as was Justice McIntyre's
reputation 10 Nor has the Lamer Court explicitly endorsed McIntyre J.
as its touchstone for reconstructing criminal fault with both rights and
responsibilities in mind. But their philosophical starting points are
similar, and represent a contrast to the individualist approach wielded by
a majority of the Dickson Court for much of the 1980s.
Those who criticize the Lamer Court as favouring an accused's
rights while ignoring the interests of victims and of society are thus wide
off the mark; the critics may be killing the messenger when they attack
the Court for the inhuman treatment of the victim in Daviault. The ratio
decidendi in Daviault should not shock lawyers, however, nor does it
signal a retreat from the Creighton quartet. To be sure, this decision is
informative for legislators and litigators alike.
What is the lesson to be taken by legislators? The Court's
reference to legislative opportunities for a crime of intoxication is as
blunt as they get,111 and the Justice Minister has responded with Bill
C-72,112 tabled in February of this year. The Court affirmed in Daviault
that it does not like being cornered between bad facts and a legislative
lacuna.113 Indeed, this Court will not pale in response to hard cases,
believing it preferable to state the judicial response as it sees it, even if
the result is, in fact, regrettable. On the other hand, nor will this Court
tinker with imperfect but hard-won legislative attempts to redress
injustices 1 4 Rights may be limited and duties enforced as long as, inter
alia, some rational, minimal fault requirements exist for a criminal
offence.
. What is the lesson to be taken by litigators? Daviault is not so
much a signal of retreat as an insistence upon avoiding dogmatism. A
minimal level of fault is required for a conviction under Creighton, but it
does not follow that no mens rea whatsoever will suffice. Thus, if the
dissent of Sopinka J. summarily restated the criminal fault philosophy
adopted by the Lamer Court today, the majority carefully drew a line
around it.
110 See supra note 13.
111 Daviault, supra note 1 at 100, per Cory J.: "it is always open to Parliament to fashion a
remedy which would make it a crime to commit a prohibited act while drunk."
112 An Aa to amend the Criminal Code (self-induced intoxication), 1st Sess., 35th Parl., 1994-95
(passed by the House of Commons 22 June 1995).
113 Compare R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731, where the Court struck down a centuries-old
offence, despite the worst of facts (anti-Semitic literature) and the worst of defendants (Ernst
Zundel).
114 Creighton, supra note 69 at 55-57; Desousa, supra note 71 at 612.
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And what of this philosophy? For those who detect a whiff of
radical populism or neoconservatism from all this MeIntyresque talk of
society, duties, and moral bonds, I suggest a less skeptical conclusion.
There is a vast difference between populist or conservative ideologies,
on the one hand, and progressive amendments to individualist
interpretations of the Charter, on the other. Like the dissents of Mr.
Justice McIntyre, the present Court is no more given to flights of
populist fancy than the Dickson Court viewed itself as the sole harbinger
of civil libertarianism in Canada. If the current judicial trend is to
demand more responsibility of those charged with criminal offences, the
jurisprudence will, one hopes, neither retreat from its bold stance, nor
devolve into an overreaction to the "rights talk" of the Dickson Court.
The Court could do worse than to follow the imperfect but balanced
approach pursued by the Honourable William McIntyre during his days
as judicial dissenter and prophet.

